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Forthcoming in Episteme
Abstract: According to telling based views of testimony (TBVs), B has reason to believe that p
when A tells B that p because A thereby takes public responsibility for B's subsequent belief
that p. Andrew Peet presents a new argument against TBVs. He argues that insofar as A uses
context-sensitive expressions to express p, A doesn't take public responsibility for B's belief
that p. Since context-sensitivity is widespread, the kind of reason TBVs say we have to believe
what we're told, is not widespread. Peet doesn't identify any problem with his own argument
though he does attempt to limit its sceptical potential by identifying special contexts in which
TBVs stand a chance of success. A more general defence of TBVs can be provided by showing
Peet's argument to be unsound. I argue that Peet's argument is unsound because it requires us
to wrongly suppose that speakers do far less labour than their audiences in context-sensitive
linguistic  communication.  I  aim  to  show  why—in  the  context  of  the  epistemology  of
testimony  and  the  philosophy  of  language—it's  important  to  recognize  the  labour  that
speakers can do, and so can can be held responsible for not doing, in episodes of context-
sensitive linguistic communication.
1 Telling based views of testimony
According to Telling Based Views of Testimony (TBVs), an audience has a certain kind of
reason to believe that p when she is told that p. The speech act of telling someone that p is, on
such views, a public act of taking responsibility for a speaker's belief that p, when that belief
is formed in response to being so-told. So if the speaker tells someone that p and p turns out
to be false, then the speaker becomes blameworthy. According to TBVs, it's this feature of the
speech act of telling that provides an audience with a reason to believe that p when she is told
that p.
TBVs are supposed to ward off scepticism about whether testimony based beliefs can be well-
justified or constitute knowledge. Peet (2015) presents an argument for the conclusion that
TBVs  fail  at  this  task:  because  a  speaker  frequently  uses  context-sensitive  expressions  to
express the propositions she asserts to others, a speaker hardly ever performs a public act of
taking responsibility for her hearer's belief that p when that belief is formed in response to
such assertions.  Peet then tries to rein in the scope of this conclusion by describing special
kinds of context in which context-sensitivity does not have this devastating effect on the kind
of reason described by TBVs.
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In this paper, I will argue that Peet's argument is unsound. Peet helps himself to a description
of context-sensitive linguistic communication which allocates the lion's share of the work in
context-sensitive linguistic communication to the audience. The description thus implies that
the audience is generally responsible for failures of communication, not the speaker.  This
description, however, is partial. The speaker does quite a bit of performative work in making
her intended content clear and unequivocal to her audience; and she is accountable for this
work. Once we recognize this, two things seem to follow. Firstly, Peet's argument includes a
false premise and for that reason, the threat posed by linguistic context-sensitivity can be
reined in much more thoroughly than Peet suggests. Secondly, research into context-sensitive
linguistic  communication  within  the  philosophy  of  language  has  been  shaped  by  this
description  in  ways  that  obscure  the  likely  importance  to  successful  context-sensitive
linguistic communication of the broader actions pursued by speaking.
2 Peet's argument against TBVs
Peet defines plausible deniability as follows:
Plausible deniability
An agent has plausible deniability about intending to communicate a proposition p
with an utterance u of a sentence s if that agent is able to tell a story (with at least some
degree  of  believability)  about  their  attitudes  and  expectations  at  the  same time  of
utterance such that a reasonable agent with those attitudes and expectations could
utter s with no intention to communicate p. (Peet, 2015, p. 31)
Notice that this story does not have to be true.
Peet believes that if a speaker has plausible deniability about intending to communicate that p
then  she  can  deny  responsibility  for  her  audience's  belief  that  p  when  the  speaker  has
asserted that p. She can convincingly say that she wasn't taking responsibility for beliefs with
that content because p wasn't the content she intended to communicate. Moreover, if she can
deny responsibility for the audience's belief that p—regardless of whether or not she in fact
does deny  it—then  (according  to  Peet)  she  wasn't  publicly  taking  responsibility  for  the
audience's belief that p. Consequently, the kind of reason that an audience has to believe that
p when she is told that p, according to TBVs, is absent.
Even  if  Peet  is  right  up  to  this  point,  there  need  be  no  problem for  TBVs.  If  plausible
deniability is something that sometimes happens, but far from always, then a TBV adherent
can simply concede that sometimes audiences don't have a reason to believe what has been
communicated to them. Plausible deniability will be a problem for TBVs only if plausible
deniability is widespread. In that case, the kind of reason audiences have to believe that p
when  p  is  communicated  to  them  generally  doesn't  exist.  However,  setting  aside  the
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exceptions that I'll introduce at the end of this section, Peet believes that if the speaker uses a
sentence  to  communicate  that  p  to  her  audience  which  includes  a  context-sensitive
expression,  then,  the  speaker  will  have  plausible  deniability.  Thus,  given  that  context-
sensitive expressions are widespread, it follows that plausible deniability is too and thus, in
turn, that in a large range of cases, the kind of reason an audience has to believe that p when
she is told that p, according to TBVs, is absent.
Why  think  that  context-sensitivity  provides  speakers  with  plausible  deniability?  An
expression is context-sensitive if and only if that expression can have different contents in
different contexts. For example, in one context, one can use the adjective “tall” in such a way
that five-year-old John falls within its extension whereas in another context one can use the
adjective “tall” in such a way that John does not fall within its extension, even though we
speak of John in the same condition in both contexts. Notice that context-sensitivity doesn't
require a change in the meaning of a word. The meaning of “tall” doesn't change in the way,
for example, that the meaning of the word “girl” has changed throughout the word's history:
it used to mean young person, it now means young female person. Context-sensitivity is not
meaning  change.  Context-sensitivity  is  the  under-determination  of  content  by  context-
invariant meaning.
Context-sensitivity,  thus  understood,  has  implications  for  linguistic  communication  using
context-sensitive expressions. If a sentence includes context-sensitive expressions, then there
isn't just one proposition that corresponds to it. The sentence can be used to express an open-
ended range of different propositions. Hence, an audience cannot read-off the proposition
that a speaker intends to tell an audience just by examining the sentence. The audience will
have to rely upon additional  means. That means will  probably consist of what Peet  calls
“knowledge context”:
Knowledge context
the audience's representation of factors such as mutual knowledge, past utterances,
Gricean  norms,  the  mutual  goals  of  the  conversation,  and  any  other  information
generally  relevant  to  interpretation  other  than  basic  knowledge  of  the  syntax  and
invariant semantic content of the utterance. (Peet, 2015, p. 31)
However, some of the representations in the audience's knowledge context are liable to be
false (cf. (Peet, 2015, p. 31)). This possibility allows the speaker to plausibly deny that the
proposition she intended to tell  the audience is the proposition the audience thought the
speaker intended to tell the audience. She can plausibly deny this by exercising her ability to
tell a story about her own attitudes and expectations such that a reasonable person with such
attitudes  and expectations  would not  have intended to  communicate  the  proposition  the
audience took her to communicate. Here is one of Peet's two examples of such a story:
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Scalar implicature
We are planning a group trip to a theme park and deciding how many cars to take. I
wish to cause logistical  problems because I  hate fun, so I say 'Matt has three kids'
knowing that he has five. On the day of the trip Matt arrives with his five children and
we don't have enough space in the car. You challenge me for saying that Matt had only
three children. However, I might attempt to maintain that I didn't mean he had  only
three children, I meant that he had at least three children, so we would need at least
three additional seats. The plausibility of such a story will depend on the way I said
'Matt has three kids' and the immediate preceding utterances, however we rarely recall
such  minute  details  of  the  conversational  context,  so  it  would  not  be  difficult  to
construct a plausible story on which I intended to communicate only that Matt has at
least three children. (Peet, 2015, pp. 32–33)
If  this  example is  representative  of  what  can be done when the  speaker makes  use of  a
context-sensitive expression, then, with Peet, it seems that we can generalize:
[I]f  recovery of an asserted content requires extensive appeal to knowledge context
then the speaker will often be able to claim that the audience recovered the wrong
proposition, thus disclaiming responsibility for the audience's belief. (Peet, 2015, p. 33)
In this passage, Peet's 'thus' indicates that there is a second conditional in his reasoning that
has the consequent of the first conditional as its antecedent. We know, also, from what else he
says, that he thinks the antecedent of the first conditional is true. So, making this all explicit,
Peet's argument can be laid out as follows:
Peet's Anti-TBV Argument
(1) If recovery of an asserted content requires extensive appeal to knowledge context
then the speaker will often have plausible deniability.
(2) If the speaker will often have plausible deniability then she will often be able to
disclaim responsibility for the audience's belief.
(3)  Recovery  of  an  asserted  content  often  requires  extensive  appeal  to  knowledge
context.
Therefore:
(4) The speaker is often able to disclaim responsibility for the audience's belief.
If we accept (4) then we have to accept that TBVs are unfit for purpose. If a speaker is able to
disclaim responsibility for her audience's belief then she didn't perform a public act of taking
responsibility  for  her  audience's  belief.  So  if  the  speaker  is  often  able  to  disclaim
responsibility for the audience's belief,  then the kind of telling which, according to TBVs,
gives audiences a reason to believe what they're told, typically doesn't happen.
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I said earlier that Peet tries to rein in the scope of the conclusion of his argument. He (2015, p.
48) describes a set of resources which make it harder for 'a speaker to claim mismatch without
absurdity.' He thinks that these resources are absent in certain discourses, but not others. He
(2015, p. 49) lists as possible discourses in which they are absent: religious discourse, public
political discourse, and ethical discourse outside of academic settings. However, Peet does not
think that these resources are generally effective in the discourses where they are available.
For  Peet  also  distinguishes  between  one-off  attempts  to  escape  responsibility  for  telling
someone that p when p is false by claiming that one never intended to communicate that p,
and, repeat offenders, who repeatedly make such such claims. According to Peet (2015, pp.
48–49), the resources which make it harder for a speaker to claim mismatch without absurdity
are generally effective only against repeat offenders. Repeat offenders will make their own
claims of mismatch increasingly implausible in discourses where the resources Peet describes
are available.
For the sake of argument, let's grant that all of this is true. Even so, Peet only manages to
provide  a  way to  resist  the  conclusion  of  his  argument  as  it  applies  to  repeat  offenders
speaking in  a subset  of  discourses.  Beyond such exceptions,  Peet's  conclusion remains in
place: i.e. the kind of reason we have for believing what we're told—according to TBVs—is
absent.  I  think this  is  an unnecessarily partial  response to the challenge he raises against
TBVs. We can find a much more general response to his challenge by showing that one of the
premises in his argument is false.
3 Applying the argument to Fricker's and the assurance theorists' TBVs
Peet targets two TBVs in particular: Elizabeth Fricker's (2006, 2012) and assurance views of
testimony  (Peet  lists:  (Hinchman,  2005;  Moran,  2005;  Ross,  1986)).  I  think  Peet  wrongly
presents his anti-TBV argument as having application, in identical ways, to these two TBVs.
Whereas he explains in some detail why Fricker's TBV is vulnerable to plausible deniability,
he assumes without argument, that parallel considerations apply to the assurance TBV. Thus
when stating the problem that plausible deniability poses for the assurance theorists, Peet
writes:
As we observed when discussing Fricker's view, the speaker's public commitment to
defend  the  audience's  belief  is  precisely  the  type  of  commitment  the  deniability
problem undermines... speakers don't undertake the assurance theorist's required type
of commitment in making [their] utterances (Peet, 2015, pp. 38–39)
In this section,  I  will  argue that the considerations which Peet puts forward in favour of
thinking  that  a  speaker's  plausible  deniability  undermines  her  ability  to  make  Fricker's
commitments do not favour thinking that a speaker's plausible deniability undermines her
ability to make the commitments described by the assurance theorists.
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Being TBVs, according to both Fricker's TBV and the assurance theorists' TBV, the audience of
a speaker has a reason to believe that p when the speaker tells her that p because the speaker
publicly  takes  responsibility  for  the  truth  of  p  in  telling  the  audience  that  p.  However,
according to Fricker's TBV, the audience has this reason because the speaker will face social
sanction if she tells the audience that p when p is not true. It's the threat of social sanction that
keeps the speaker in  check and which justifies  an audience in believing the speaker.  For
Fricker (2012, pp. 62–63), it's because a speaker would not easily have asserted that p unless p
were true, that the audience is justified in believing what she is told. This talk of “ease” is
based on what a rational speaker—who wants to avoid social sanction—will probably end up
doing. But according to the assurance theorists' TBV, the reason the audience has to believe
that p when she is told that p is not that it would be hard for the speaker to avoid social
sanction for asserting that p when p is not true. It  is  rather that the speech act of telling
changes the deontic status of the speaker: it places upon her an obligation and it's the fact that
the speaker has this obligation that gives the audience a non-evidential reason for believing
what she was told. On this, Moran (at least) is rather explicit:
The speaker confers a right of complaint, should what the speaker is told turn out to be
false. (Moran, 2005, p. 21)
[I]n testimony in particular the kind of reason for belief that is presented is one that
functions in part by binding speaker and audience together, and altering the normative
relationship between them. (ibid, p.22)
Whether the speaker finds it easy or hard to escape sanction for breaking her obligation is
neither  here  nor  there  as  regards  the  existence  of  the  kind  of  reason  described  by  the
assurance theorists.
Consequently, plausible deniability threatens the very existence of the reason described by
Fricker but it doesn't threaten the very existence of the reason described by the assurance
theorists—or if it does, it does not do so in the same way. Given that the speaker has plausible
deniability, the threat of social sanction can be avoided by the speaker when she asserts that p
when p is not true. Thus there's nothing that makes it hard for her to assert that p when p is
not true. So the reason Fricker describes for believing that p when a speaker asserts that p,
doesn't exist when the speaker has plausible deniability. But one can give someone a right of
complaint even though it's possible (and even if it's easy) for one to convince others that one
didn't do so. For example, it's not uncommon for us to commit to doing something or being
somewhere by doing things that we could later plausibly say were sarcasm or a joke. But that
fact  in  itself  doesn't  prove  that,  on  all  those  occasions,  we  weren't  really  making  the
commitment at all: if we actually went on to convincingly claim that we were joking, when
we weren't really joking, then we'd be convincingly lying about what we did, not proving that
we didn't make the commitment in the first place. But then, if telling someone that p is to give
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someone a right of complaint if p turns out to be false, the fact that one could convince others
that one didn't give the audience a right to complain if p in particular turns out to be false,
doesn't  mean  that  one  didn't  do  so.  Thus  plausible  deniability  doesn't  imply  that  the
assurance theorists' reason doesn't exist.
Although Peet wrongly takes it as given that the considerations he sets out against Fricker's
TBV also straightforwardly apply to the assurance theorists' TBV, there are amendments that
Peet could make to his argument to try and show that the assumption that speakers have
plausible  deniability  implies  that  assurance  theorists  fail  to  avoid  scepticism  about
testimonial beliefs. The most straightforward way to do this is to suppose that if a speaker can
easily convince her audience that she didn't commit to the truth of p then she didn't commit
to the truth of p:
Commitment Connection (CC)
In order for the speaker to make a commitment to her audience that p is true, by telling
the audience that p, it cannot be easy for the speaker to subsequently convince her
audience that she didn't intend to tell her audience that p.
If  the  speaker  has  plausible  deniability,  then  it  is  easy  for  the  speaker  to  subsequently
convince her audience that she didn't intend to tell her audience that p. Hence, given CC, the
speaker didn't make a commitment to the truth of p to her audience.
But as we have already seen, CC is not plausible. Generally speaking: making a commitment
to  someone  doesn't  require  that  it  be  very  difficult  for  one  to  subsequently  provide
misleading evidence to the effect that one didn't make the commitment. So the connection CC
describes between the making of commitments and the ability to convince someone that one
didn't make the commitment is too strong. However, if we weaken this connection so that it is
not true that if a speaker has plausible deniability then she cannot make commitments to
others, then a speaker's possession of plausible deniability is consistent with her being able to
make commitments to others. In which case, plausible deniability will pose no direct problem
for assurance theorists:  their kind of reason (a commitment)  doesn't  disappear because of
plausible deniability.
Alternatively, one might try, not to connect the existence of the audience's reason for believing
what is asserted to the speaker's possession of plausible deniability, but instead, to connect
the audience's  access to the audience's reason for believing what is asserted to the speaker's
possession of plausible deniability:
Access Connection (AC)
When a speaker asserts that p to an audience, her audience knows that the speaker
asserts that p only if the speaker does not have plausible deniability for p.
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Although plausible deniability doesn't imply the non-existence of the reason that TBVs say
audiences have to believe what they are told, given AC, plausible deniability does imply that
audiences typically don't know what's been asserted to them. Given that an audience must
know what has been asserted in order to come to have knowledge with the content of what is
asserted, AC brings with it the sceptical conclusion that TBV theorists are trying to avoid.1
But AC is also implausible. To have plausible deniability is not to actually provide, but rather,
to be able to provide misleading evidence that leads an audience to give up her belief that the
speaker really intended to communicate that p. However, generally speaking, if one forms a
belief that p on the basis of evidence e, the mere possibility that someone could provide one
with misleading counter-evidence that leads one to give up one's belief that p doesn't suffice
to show that the evidence upon which one based one's belief that p didn't suffice to justify
one's belief that p—perhaps even to make it knowledge. For example, I could see Mary in the
supermarket and form the belief that Mary is in town. Although it doesn't actually happen,
it's  nonetheless  possible  that  someone  subsequently  tells  me  the  falsehood  that  Mary's
definitely in Mexico right now. In many such cases, I am likely to abandon my belief. But that
doesn't mean that, in actual fact (when there's no misleading counter-evidence), my original
reason for thinking that Mary is in town doesn't really provide me with reason sufficient to
make my belief  that  she is  in town knowledge.  If  it  did,  we would have a problem that
applies to a great many of our empirical beliefs, and not just to beliefs based upon the kind of
reason described by assurance theorists. Thus, AC is implausible: it implies a very general
kind of scepticism regardless of what assurance theorists have to say about knowledge by
testimony.
Things are different with Fricker's TBV precisely because she simply defines the act of telling
in such a way that the act doesn't happen if the speaker has plausible deniability. So we don't
need any further premise (controversial or otherwise) that connects the kind of reason she
says we have to believe what we're told to the absence of plausible deniability in order for
plausible deniability to pose a problem for that particular TBV.
Perhaps  Peet  can  supplement  his  argument  in  some  other  way.  But  as  things  stand,  he
explicitly provides an argument that links plausible deniability to only Fricker's TBV. So it's
upon this TBV that we'll focus in what follows.
4 Responsibility for Mismatches
Let's  say  that  there  is  a  mismatch when  the  proposition  that  the  speaker  intends  to
communicate by uttering a given sentence diverges from the proposition that the audience
thinks the speaker intends to communicate. When a mismatch arises, we have available to us
three different ways that we can describe the mismatch. With each of these comes a different
1     Though  others  might  be  tempted  by  it,  Peet  himself  seems  unlikely  to  pursue  this  possibility.  He
(forthcoming) has argued that knowledge of what has been asserted (or at least, what has been said) is not
required for knowledge by testimony.
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allocation  of  responsibility  for  the  mismatch.  Firstly,  we  can  say  that  the  audience
misunderstood the speaker: the audience is responsible for the mismatch. Secondly, we can
say that the speaker was being unclear, misleading, obtuse etc.: the audience is faultless, the
speaker  is  at  fault  for  the  mismatch.  This  may  be  so  even  if  the  audience  has  false
representations  of  the  context,  provided  that  the  speaker  is  responsible  for  the  audience
having such false representations. Thirdly, we can say that “there was a misunderstanding”:
we remain neutral as to whether the speaker or the audience is to blame for the mismatch.
With this distinction in hand, we can define a plausible assumption.
Speaker's Responsibility (SR)
When there is a  mismatch,  if  the speaker is responsible for the mismatch then the
speaker is responsible for the audience's belief that p (where p is what the audience
reasonably took the speaker to assert), even if the speaker intended to communicate
some other proposition q.
For example, suppose that I'm giving you directions to my car, and I say, “it's red,” meaning
that the car has a red undercoat (whilst its surface colour is blue), but (as is reasonable) you
take me to mean that the car has a red surface colour, then I am to blame for you coming to
think that the car has a red surface. I am responsible for your belief and can be criticized if
(when) it turns out to be unwarranted and false. This is so even though the belief you form is
not the one I intended you to form.
SR implies that premise (2) is false. Peet appears to suppose that if the speaker can convince
her  audience  that  she  didn't  intend  to  communicate  what  the  audience  took  her  to
communicate then the speaker can convince her audience that she is not responsible for the
audience's belief.  But given SR, this isn't  true. For if  the mismatch arose because of some
incompetence on the part of the speaker, then, given SR, the speaker is still responsible for the
audience's belief, even if the speaker didn't intend to communicate its content. It's true that
the  speaker  is  not  obliged  to  defend  the  truth  of  the  audience's  belief—so  she  is  not
responsible for the belief in this sense. But she is responsible for the fact that her audience has
this belief,  and is blameworthy for that fact,  if  it's  something she did that resulted in the
mismatch. So, if she's responsible for the mismatch, she's still responsible for the audience's
belief, even given her plausible deniability. We should reject premise (2).
But  if  SR  is  a  plausible  assumption,  why  does  Peet  think  that  the  speaker's  plausible
deniability implies that the speaker can convince her audience that she is not responsible for
the audience's resulting belief? Peet doesn't explicitly address this question. But we can piece
together a plausible answer by noting some features of Peet's discussion.
Notice first that one subtle but definite feature of Peet's discussion is that Peet repeatedly
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chooses, without argument, to use descriptions of mismatches which attribute responsibility
to  the  audience  for  the  mismatch.  Here  are  three  examples.  Firstly,  when  Peet  describes
linguistic communication using context-sensitive expressions, he says:
In order to assign content to a wide range of context-sensitive utterances audiences
must rely heavily on their knowledge of the conversational context. Because of this
reliance on context there are many ways the recovery of content can go wrong. As a
result,  speakers  are  able  to  make  assertions  and  yet  deny  responsibility  for  the
proposition  asserted,  claiming  that  the  audience  made  a  mistake  in  resolving  the
context-sensitivity. (Peet, 2015, p. 29)
Peet  supposes  that  if  the  recovery  of  content  goes  wrong—if  there  is  a  mismatch—then
speakers will be able to deny responsibility for communicated contents because the  audience
made  a  mistake.  Secondly,  and  similarly,  consider  again  the  passage  in  which  Peet
summarizes the main moves of his argument against TBVs:
[I]f the recovery of an asserted content requires extensive appeal to knowledge context
then the speaker will often be able to claim that the audience recovered the wrong
proposition, thus disclaiming responsibility for the audience's belief. (Peet, 2015, p. 33)
The extensive  appeal  to  knowledge context  is  supposed to  open up space  for  inaccurate
representations of the context in the knowledge context. Peet supposes here that if there are
inaccurate representations in the knowledge context then the speaker is not responsible for
the belief that the audience forms, believing it to be what the speaker asserted. The possibility
that the speaker is responsible for the inaccurate representations in the audience's knowledge
context, is quietly elided from consideration. Thirdly, when Peet (2015, p. 40) does explicitly
consider the possibility that  the speaker has made a mistake about the context, and on this
basis has been misleading, he assumes that the speaker can use this mistake to excuse herself.
Peet thus applies different standards to speakers and audiences. When an audience makes a
mistake about the knowledge context, the audience is to blame for forming a belief other than
that which the speaker intended. But when a speaker makes a mistake about the context, this
absolves the speaker of responsibility for the audience's belief. Peet seems to be assuming that
if there is a mismatch then it's the audience's fault even if it's the speaker who caused the
mismatch.
If Peet were right that speakers are generally not responsible for mismatches—audiences are—
then SR would be false. So our reason for rejecting premise (2) would fall away. Is Peet right
to  assume what  he  does  about  mismatches?  He  makes  no  comment  about  his  choice  of
description. But one clue as to why he describes mismatches in this way can be found in the
way  that  he  tends  to  describe  episodes  of  context-sensitive  linguistic  communication.
Consider once again, the opening passage of Peet's paper:
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In order to assign content to a wide range of context-sensitive utterances audiences
must rely heavily on their knowledge of the conversational context. Because of this
reliance on context there are many ways the recovery of content can go wrong. As a
result,  speakers  are  able  to  make  assertions  and  yet  deny  responsibility  for  the
proposition  asserted,  claiming  that  the  audience  made  a  mistake  in  resolving  the
context-sensitivity. (Peet, 2015, p. 29)
Here Peet focuses entirely upon the role played by the audience in context-sensitive linguistic
communication. The speaker's role is merely to produce an utterance. The rest of the work
takes  the  form  of  the  “recovery”  of  content—and  this  work  is  done  exclusively  by  the
audience.  Thus  construed,  in  context-sensitive  linguistic  communication,  aside  from  her
utterance, the speaker is a passive objective of interpretation—a hermeneutical puzzle. The
audience is the active participant—the interpreter. Peet portrays the speaker and audience in
these  passive  and  active  roles  in  episodes  of  context-sensitive  linguistic  communication
repeatedly  (ibid,  p.29,  p.30,  p.31,  p.32,  p.33,  p.35,  p.43,  p.44,  p.45,  p.47).  If  one  thinks  of
context-sensitive  linguistic  communication  in  these  terms  then  one  will  think—given  the
plausible  principle  that  one  cannot  be  held  responsible  when  one  couldn't  have  done
otherwise—that the speaker just cannot be held responsible for mismatches. SR will appear
irrelevant to whether the speaker or the audience is responsible for the belief the audience
forms in response to apparently being told that p, because the speaker cannot be responsible
for mismatches, given the passive role speakers play in episodes of context-sensitive linguistic
communication. Thus, premise (2) of Peet's argument will not be under threat.
In construing the distribution of work in context-sensitive linguistic communication in this
way, Peet is (apparently) following those whose work he builds upon—amongst whom are
influential voices in the study of context-sensitive linguistic communication. He cites Fricker
(2012) (from whom Peet borrows the thrust of his argument), Carston (2002) and Sperber and
Wilson (1986) (who are also cited by Fricker). Fricker, Carston and Sperber and Wilson all
describe context-sensitive linguistic communication in a similar, and often the same, way as
Peet. For example, on page 1 of Sperber and Wilson's classic text on context-sensitivity, they
orient their readers to the intended subject matter thus:
Communication is a process involving two information-processing devices. One device
modifies  the  physical  environment  of  the  other.  As  a  result,  the  second  device
constructs representations similar to representations already stored in the first device.
Oral  communication,  for  instance,  is  a  modification by the  speaker  of  the  hearer's
acoustic environment, as a result of which the hearer entertains thoughts similar to the
speaker's own. The study of communication raises two major questions: first, what is
communicated, and second, how is communication achieved? (Sperber & Wilson, 1986,
p. 1)
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In this passage, the speaker is reduced to being a speaker—talking (i.e. modifying the hearer's
acoustic environment) is all she does. It's then unsurprising that the rest of their book focuses
entirely upon the matter of how the audience of a speaker can recover the speaker's intended
proposition without any systematic attention paid to how the speaker can make her intention
available to her audience. Similarly, in Carston's equally influential book on linguistic context-
sensitivity, from the very start she takes Sperber and Wilson's research enterprise as her own:
Sperber  and  Wilson  (1986a/1995b)  set  out  to  give  an  account  of  how  hearers
(interpreters)  reach  the  intended  interpretation  of  an  utterance  quickly  and  with
relative certainty, despite the fact that there are, in principle, indefinitely many possible
interpretations, all  compatible with the linguistically encoded content.  The question
that has to be addressed is how it is that hearers do not get into even lengthier chains
of  inference,  searching  for  more  and  more  possible  interpretations  and  comparing
them, in a bid to find the 'right' one or the 'best' one. (Carston, 2002, p. 2)
As with Sperber and Wilson, Carston's book subsequently focuses upon the work done by the
audience  ('how  hearers  (interpreters)  reach  the  intended  interpretation  of  an  utterance
quickly and with relative certainty') without any great concern paid to how a speaker could
do work that makes her intended content clear to her audience. Where Carston (ibid, p.7)
does consider the work of the speaker, it is limited to her choice of words.
Despite  the  venerable  (apparent)  origin  of  Peet's  construal  of  context-sensitive  linguistic
communication, should we accept it? In the next section, I argue that we should not. The
speaker  can  do  much  more  than talk  when making  apparent  the  content  she  intends  to
communicate.  Thus,  there  will  be  occasions  when  she  is  responsible  for  the  false
representations in the audience's knowledge context,  not the audience herself. So SR does
have application and thus premise (2) of Peet's argument is false.
5 What speakers can do
I proceed in three stages. In the first two, I describe a pair of general features of actions done
in the presence of others.  In the third,  I  explain how these two general  features together
provide a speaker with a way of making her intention clear to her audience which does not
reduce to uttering a sentence and meaning something by it.
5.1 Actions in public places
Recognition of our intentional actions seems to come naturally. Elizabeth Anscombe was right
when she wrote:
I am sitting in a chair writing, and anyone grown to the age of reason in the same
world would know this as soon as he saw me, and in general it would be his first
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account of what I was doing; if this were something he arrived at with difficulty, and
what he knew straight off were precisely how I was affecting the acoustic properties of
the room (to me a very recondite piece of information), then communication between
us would be rather severely impaired. (Anscombe, 1957, p. 8)
But the recognition of action can be facilitated and hindered by the person doing it. In his The
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life the sociologist Erving Goffman seeks to describe the work
of making clear what it is that we are doing, when we are in the presence of others: what he
(1974, p. 26) calls the 'dramaturgical problems of presenting the activity before others.' Mostly
using Goffman's own observations, I will describe seven ways in which this can be done.
Firstly, there are props and settings we can use which will make more obvious what it is that
we are doing. For example, if you go for a jog in a suit then you are likely to provoke the
question: what is she doing? This contrasts with what is likely to happen if you go for a jog in
running-clothes. The same question is much less likely to be raised because it's much more
immediately apparent that you are not running from a thief, running after someone, late for a
meeting,  etc.  Similarly,  if  a  window cleaner  climbs  a  ladder  to  inspect  a  window before
cleaning it, if he has the right over-alls, a parked van with an appropriate logo or description,
and his cleaning tools, then it will be all the more obvious what he is doing than if these
props were absent. Agents have control over what props they use in the doing of activity and
in what setting they attempt to do it. These can be used to make it clearer what is being done.
Secondly, one can infuse one's activity with 'signs which dramatically highlight and portray
confirmatory  facts  that  might  otherwise  remain  unapparent  or  obscure.'  (Goffman,  1974,
p.40). For example, a man in a suit, who crawls on all fours, in the grass, may, when noticed
by another, begin muttering to himself, “where is that cuff link?” in order to make it clearer
what  it  is  that  he  is  doing.  When a  baseball  umpire  has  to  make  a  confident,  informed
judgement, he may emphasise the speed and confidence with which he gives it in order to
ensure that impression. A person who is waiting for another in a place where it might not at
all be obvious that he is waiting for someone, may glance at his watch more regularly and
look around more obviously than he otherwise might,  in order 'to  give a visible familiar
shape to his intention.' (Goffman, 1963, pp. 78–79)
Thirdly, the agent may hide distracting elements of the activity which would put the activity
into an ambiguous or misleading light. A wife who tells her husband that she's going home
may downplay her tiredness so that it doesn't get misinterpreted as irritation at something
done by her husband during the evening. A young philosopher disappointed at her latest
rejection,  may  hide  her  disappointment  so  that  it  doesn't  ruin  and  cast  doubt  upon  the
genuine congratulations she gives to her colleague.
Fourthly, distracting mistakes may be practised against to ensure their not happening. A radio
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guest may practice his answers to foreseeable questions so as to avoid creating a misleading
impression that he cannot correct, if it arises on air. A person going on a date, a job interview,
an outing with unknown acquaintances may envisage possible conversations so as to avoid
“putting her foot in it” in a way that is not recoverable once the date, interview or outing has
commenced.
Fifth,  within the confines of conversation, there are various things one can do to make it
clearer  what  it  is  that  one is  doing,  at  a  given point  in  the conversation.  Here  are  three
examples.  Firstly,  a  speaker can establish or find a place in the conversation that  doesn't
obscure what she is doing. Turns in a conversation commonly establish particular tasks for
the person selected as the next speaker. For example, if someone asks a question, then the task
is to answer the question. As the conversation analyst Emmanuel Schegloff writes:
What is critical here is that the action which some talk is doing can be grounded in its
position, not just its composition – not just the words that compose it, but its placement
after a question. Talk after a question invites hearing for how it could be answering...
(Schegloff, 2007, pp. 20–21)
The same applies to similar cases. If someone provides an assessment and directs her speech
at you then you are given the task of agreeing or disagreeing with the assessment (Pomerantz,
1984). If someone announces news to you then a receipt and an assessment of the news is
expected (Terasaki, 2004). If someone makes an offer, then it's to be accepted or rejected. If
someone offers an invitation then that sets up the task of accepting or rejecting it. Farewells
are to be met with farewells and greetings with greetings. If you try to perform an action at
the wrong point in a conversation (e.g. acceptance of an offer just after an assessment has
been made) then it  will  be unclear (or certainly,  less  clear)  what action you are trying to
perform. Secondly, speakers can prepare for an action in a conversation over the course of
several  turns.  For  example,  announcements  may  be  preceded  by  a  series  of  preliminary
questions that make it clearer that an announcement is in the offing: e.g. “did you hear the
terrible news?” (Terasaki, 2004). Similarly, if someone wants to be understood to be telling a
story, then she will provide a small preface that helps to ensure that others don't cut her off
before she finishes (Sacks, 1974). Thirdly, speakers can arrange or make clear relevant aspects
of the wider circumstances that bear upon what action they are performing at a given point in
the conversation. For example, whether an utterance (regardless of its form) will get heard as
a question or a statement depends to a great degree on the known relative epistemic positions
of the speaker and her recipient (Heritage, 2012). If you and I both know that you were at the
party and I was not, and consequently that you were in a position to know who was there,
and I am not, then if I say, “John was there,” it's much more likely to get heard as a question
than if our epistemic positions were reversed—in which case it would sound like a statement.
One can make one's conversational action—statement or question—clearer by making it clear
that there is this asymmetry to our epistemic positions.
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So this is the first feature of actions done in the presence of others that I want to register: they
can be done in ways that make it more or less obvious what is being done. Although anyone
grown to the age of reason may indeed be able to tell by looking what Anscombe was doing,
that  doesn't  mean  that  when  in  the  presence  of  others,  there  are  not  various  ways  that
Anscombe could make it more or less obvious what she was doing by changing precisely how
she was doing it. If she screamed whilst writing, if every 10 seconds she jumped twice and sat
down again, if she wrote one word per page, if she carved the words on her table (and didn't
write  them on her  paper),  then  to  any onlookers  it  would become more  obscure  than it
otherwise would have been what she was doing.
5.2 Instrumental normative constraints
The second feature of actions done in the presence of  others that  I  want to register is  as
follows. Actions can be related as means to ends: one Φs by Ψing. For example, one can be
sailing to the isle of Wight by moving the rudder, one can write a paper by typing on the
keyboard, and one can sabotage the wedding by making the announcement. Moreover there
are various manners in which one can do actions. One can move the rudder, type on the
keyboard,  or  make  the  announcement  in  various  different  ways.  For  instance,  one  can
regulate the way one moves the rudder in accordance with the currents of the ocean. One can
type on the keyboard so as to generate simple well-formed sentences. The ends one pursues
by a  given means place instrumental  normative  constraints  on the  manner in  which one
pursues the means: given that one is Φing by Ψing, and given the circumstances, unless one
Ψs in a given manner, one's Ψing doesn't amount to, or contribute towards, one's Φing. So
insofar as one is Φing by Ψing, one ought to Ψ in a particular manner. For example, unless
one moves the rudder in a particular way, one won't be sailing to the isle of Wight by moving
the rudder. Unless, one types in a given way, one won't be writing a paper by typing.
5.3 Speaker's work
If we put together the fact that agents can make their actions more or less clear to others with
the fact that one's broader actions place normative instrumental constraints on one's narrower
intentions, then we have a method for publicizing some of one's intentions. By making it clear
what activity one is engaged in, one can make apparent to others what one's “narrower”
intentions ought to be, and hence, given that one is a rational agent, what one's “narrower”
intentions in fact are. For example, if others know that you're sailing to the isle of Wight by
moving the rudder, and they know enough about the circumstances that you're in to see what
that requires of moving the rudder, then they can know how you ought to be moving the
rudder, and thus, given that you are a rational agent, they can know how you intend to move
the rudder too. In this way, publicizing one's broader projects (using the techniques sketched
in section 5.1) is a way of giving access to some of one's (other) intentions. This suffices to
show that  the  depiction  of  a  speaker  as  ultimately  passive  in  context-sensitive  linguistic
communication  misrepresents  the  speaker's  role  in  context-sensitive  linguistic
communication.
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Consider,  for  example,  quantifier  domain restriction:  the phenomenon wherein the set  of
objects  over  which  a  quantifier  ranges  is  shifted  by  changing  the  context  in  which  the
quantifier is used. Consider a sentence that Peet uses in one of his examples:
(5) Every beer is in the fridge.
Consider the following two contexts in which (5) may get used, and notice how what it is that
the speaker is doing by or in uttering (5) changes what it would be most reasonable to take
the speaker to intend as the set  of  objects  over which the quantifier phrase “every beer”
ranges.
The Wedding Party
Abe and Bob are packing up the bar for the night. Upstairs in the bar, there is a store
for extra merchandise: crisps, beers, wines, etc. There's no need for these items to be
downstairs  and it's  safer  to  leave  them upstairs  away  from customers'  wandering
hands. But Abe and Bob had ordered-in an extra batch of beer for this Friday because
they  were  hosting  a  wedding  party  and  wanted  to  make  sure  they  had  enough.
Unfortunately, their fridge wasn't big enough to store all this beer at once. So, many of
the beers were stored out in the yard, round the back of the bar, where they would be
kept  cool,  protected from customers'  wandering  hands  and where  they'd  be  more
accessible than the beers upstairs.  But now that the party is over,  and they've sold
many of the beers from the fridge, there's room enough to put all the beers from the
yard into the fridge. This they are doing. At some point in that task, Abe wants to
know whether he can go home. Abe asks Bob, “are we done?” Bob replies, “yep, every
beer is in the fridge, let's go.”
Here, given that all the relevant information has been sketched, it is most reasonable to take
the set over which the quantifier phrase “every beer” ranges to be the set of beers from the
yard. It would be unreasonable, given the activity that Bob is pursuing in uttering (5), for Bob
to intend to use the quantifier phrase “every beer” so that it ranges over a set of objects that
includes  the  beers  upstairs.  This  is  because  what  Bob  is  trying  to  do  by  uttering  (5)  is
apparent enough: he's trying to provide an answer to Abe's question, and to do that, it would
be unreasonable to use “every beer” so that it ranged over the beers upstairs—such would
make the utterance of (5) unsuited to establishing whether the two are indeed done for the
night. Provided that the broader activity that Bob is pursuing by uttering (5) is clear enough
to Abe, and to anyone else who may be interested in how he intends the quantifier phrase, it'll
be clear enough how Bob ought to intend the quantifier phrase, and thus, if he is rational,
how he is using that quantifier phrase.
If we change the activity that Bob is engaged in when he utters (5) then we can change what it
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would be reasonable for him to intend by the quantifier phrase in (5). Consider:
Heatwave
It's the middle of summer. There's a heatwave. The air-conditioning is broken. If any
beers in Abe and Bob's bar are left in the heat for too long, their flavours will change in
ways that the customers will not like, and they'll be unable to sell the beers—leading to
a loss of earnings (which they cannot afford). So this week they don't order so many
beers. This way, they can ensure that they have enough space in the fridge to store all
the beers in the bar—upstairs and downstairs—in the fridge. There are no beers, this
time, outside in the yard. During the process of shifting beers to the fridge, Abe wants
to know if they've finished the task at hand. He says to Bob, “are we done?” and Bob
replies “yep, every beer is in the fridge.”
This  time,  given what  Bob is  doing in  uttering (5),  it  is  most  reasonable to  interpret  the
quantifier phrase as ranging over all the beers in the bar. For given Bob's apparent aim in
using the sentence—viz. to indicate whether the activity they are pursuing is complete—he
satisfies that aim only by so using the quantifier phrase.
Thus one can help to make a given intention with which the quantifier phrase is used the one
that  seems most  reasonable,  by  making  apparent  factors  that  would make that  intention
instrumentally  reasonable  to  have,  and  by  ensuring  that  distracting  factors  which  might
lower confidence in the reasonableness of that intention are hidden from view or not present
at all.
In various ways, Bob might have intended something else by the quantifier phrase, in either
case. This would be because he was actually pursuing some activity other than that which we
take him—given the description of the situation provided—to be pursuing. In Heatwave, for
example, he might have under-estimated how badly the bar needed to save money, and for
that reason, thought that only the upstairs beers need be moved to the fridge, and not all. But
he might not have made this apparent in an earlier conversation wherein they had decided to
engage upon the task of moving the beers. If indeed, the financial situation is that bad, and
Bob had made a mistake about this, then the responsibility for a resulting mismatch would
fall to Bob for being unclear and not to Abe for misunderstanding Bob.
We can conclude then that there's work that the speaker does in episodes of context-sensitive
linguistic communication, besides uttering words, and hence, that if the speaker fails to do
this work well, then mismatches that result from such will be the speaker's fault and not the
audience's. It seems then that there's something wrong after all with Peet's exclusive focus on
the work done by audiences in context-sensitive linguistic communication. Consequently, we
should reject premise (2) of Peet's argument: a speaker's possession of plausible deniability
does not imply that the speaker can escape social sanction for her audience's resulting belief.
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6 Predictably communicating
Peet (ibid, pp. 39-40) discusses and rejects a response to his argument which is similar to the
response that I have provided. It's worth explaining how the response I have provided is
different from the response Peet  considers and why it  is  not subject  to Peet's  reasons for
rejecting the position he discusses. Consider the following thesis:
Predictably False (PF)
Often, if a speaker makes an assertion which predictably results in a false belief then
the speaker will be held responsible for the false belief.
Given PF, we might expect that speakers will not easily predictably communicate that p, if p
were false—for, given PF, they will  face social sanction if they do so. If  so,  then Fricker's
reason for believing what one is told might well be found for propositions that one would
predictably believe when a speaker makes a given assertion. Thus, the problem that plausible
deniability poses for Fricker's TBV could be bypassed. Peet grants PF but he denies that it has
this  consequence.  He gives  two reasons for  the denial.  Firstly,  he (2015,  p.39)  thinks that
speakers 'are generally far more careless about what they might predictably communicate
than what they clearly and openly communicate.' If speakers are sufficiently careless about
what they predictably communicate, then, even if speakers are held responsible for what they
predictably  communicate,  that  doesn't  seem  to  stop  them  from  easily  predictably
communicating  false  propositions.  But  then  there  is  no  reason  of  the  kind  described  by
Fricker for believing what someone predictably communicates.  Secondly, Peet (2015, p.40)
denies that PF, even if  true,  significantly reduces the plausible deniability possessed by a
speaker for what she predictably communicates. If so, then, Peet assumes, she will be able to
avoid responsibility for predictably communicating false propositions. Hence, once again, we
shouldn't expect an audience to have Fricker's kind of reason for believing what the speaker
predictably communicates.
Neither of Peet's reasons for rejecting the PF-based view apply to the objection that I'm raising
against Peet's argument. Consider first whether Peet's first reason for rejecting the PF-based
view has application to the objection I have presented. The objection I have presented is that
premise (2) of Peet's argument is false because SR is non-vacuously true. Let's suppose that
Peet  is  right  that  we  don't  generally  care  whether  the  propositions  we  predictably
communicate are true. That's entirely consistent with it being true that one does care about
being blamed for the following: an audience comes to believe that p, when one didn't intend
to  communicate  that  p  but  the  audience  nonetheless  believed  that  one  intended  to
communicate that p, and, moreover,  one is responsible for the  discrepancy between  one's
intention and the belief that resulted. So Peet's first reason for rejection doesn't apply to the
objection I've raised. Consider now whether Peet's second reason for rejecting the PF-based
view has application to the objection I have presented. The objection I presented was not an
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attempt to show that there's any less plausible deniability than Peet thinks there is. It was
rather  an  attempt  to  show  that  plausible  deniability  doesn't  imply  freedom  from  social
sanction.  But  the  fact  that  we  have  plausible  deniability  for  propositions  we  predictably
communicate  doesn't  provide  us  with  any  reason  for  thinking  that  plausible  deniability
implies that the speaker is free of the social sanction to which I have tried to draw attention.
But then Peet's second reason for rejecting the PF-view has no application to the objection I
have raised against Peet's argument.
Although there may appear to be a similarity between the PF-view and the objection I have
raised against Peet's argument, the objections Peet raises against the PF-view do not work
against the objection I have raised.
7 Peet's about-turn
Consider Peet's two illustrations of how plausible deniability can allow a speaker to escape
social sanction for asserting that p when p is not true. I've already stated Scalar implicature
(cf. section 2). The second example is as follows:
Quantifier domain restriction
It is the start of the new year and we have organised a party for the new graduate
students. We have a variety of beers on offer, but there are some special craft lagers I
want for myself (even though they were brought for the guests). I have stored most of
the beer in the fridge, but I have put the craft lagers outside. Sally, one of the new
students, arrives and asks where the beer is, so I tell her 'every beer is in the fridge'.
Later on you find the craft lagers outside and ask me why I told Sally that every beer
was in the fridge. In response to this challenge I might attempt to construct a story
along the following lines: I had heard that Sally was a vegan, and I am aware that craft
lagers often contain animal products. So when I said 'every beer is in the fridge' I didn't
mean every beer we had purchased for the party, I meant every beer which was safe
for Sally, as a vegan, to drink. (Peet, 2015, p. 33)
In both of Peet's examples, there's good reason to suspect that even if Peet's story is believed,
he (as the speaker in each example) will, in each case, be blamed for the mismatch that is
implied by the story he tells.  In Scalar implicature,  even if  Peet  managed to convince his
fellow conversants that he didn't mean to communicate what they thought he did, insofar as
their interpretation of what he intended was reasonable at the time, it seems likely that Peet
would be blamed for the mismatch. Put it this way: Peet could assert that p only if p is true, or
alternatively,  he  could  be  reckless  in  asserting  p,  assuming  that  he  can  dodge  whatever
sanction he'll face for asserting that p if p is not true, by telling a story of mismatch like the
one in Scalar implicature. But surely the first option is preferable: there's a significant risk that
his audience will blame him for the mismatch, if he claims that there's been one. So if he is
concerned about social sanction, he's better off asserting that p only if p is true. Similarly, in
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Quantifier  domain  restriction,  Sally's  interpretation  of  Peet's  utterance  seems  perfectly
reasonable, and Peet's intended content (even though it might have been plausibly something
he genuinely meant to communicate) is at least a little delinquent given that Sally had been
given no reason to think, in the context, that Peet knew she was vegan (assuming that Peet is
not mistaken about this), or that he would be so presumptuous as to try deciding on her
behalf what she should and should not be consuming. Peet takes a significant risk of being
blamed for the mismatch that his story would imply happened, if he tells such a story. So
again, if he cares about social sanction, he's safer from it if he aims to make an assertion only
if he's confident of its truth.
Peet seems to concede some of this when he presents the examples:
For now it suffices to note that on one-off occasions we would usually let such matters
slide  and  speaker  would  usually  get  away  with  making  such  conversational
manoeuvres.  This  is  not  to  say  that  they  wouldn't  be  criticised  for  being  unclear,
simply that they would not be held to what they communicated. (ibid, p.32)
When Peet says 'they would not be held to what they communicated,' he means that they
would not be expected to defend its truth. He is nonetheless willing to concede that they are
liable to criticism for being unclear. But at this point of his paper, Peet supposes that this kind
of social sanction (i.e.  'for being unclear'  and causing a mismatch) is  no help to the TBV
theorist against the threat of plausible deniability (see also (ibid, p.38)). And yet, later on in
his paper, when attempting to rein in the damage plausible deniability does to TBVs, Peet
seems to change his mind, and allow that this kind of social sanction is of some help to the
TBV theorist:
If there is a clear common use for a term (or common default contextual value), and the
audience reasonably assigns such a value only to be met by the mismatch move later
on,  then the audience is  able  to  maintain that the speaker should have been more
explicit  about  their  intention,  maintaining  that  they  are  partly  responsible  for  the
resultant belief. (ibid, p.48)
As on p.32, the kind of responsibility for the belief that Peet thinks the speaker has is not an
obligation to defend its truth, but rather a blameworthiness for its existence. But here, unlike
on  p.32,  Peet  supposes  that  this  kind  of  responsibility  does  serve  to  curtail  the  damage
plausible deniability does to TBVs. Admittedly, Peet supposes that being held responsible for
a mismatch implies absence of plausible deniability—a false supposition, given the way that
Peet  defines  “plausible  deniability.”  Nonetheless,  if  Peet  had  conceded  on  p.32  what  he
concedes on p.48, then the problem he attempts to pose for TBVs wouldn't get started: his
examples may be examples in which the speaker has plausible deniability, but that doesn't
mean they are examples in which the speaker is not to blame for the supposed mismatch.
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Such blame will be an incentive for a rational speaker not to rely upon their possession of
plausible deniability when deciding whether to assert something the truth of which she is
uncertain. Premise (2) of his argument would have been obviously false when stated.
Moreover, notice that if we reject premise (2) of Peet's argument then we have a much more
general response to the problem that plausible deniability poses for TBVs than Peet himself
thinks is available. Peet proposes that, mostly, it's only if a speaker repeatedly makes denials
in a certain subset of discourses that she will betray that she's lying and thereby reduce the
plausibility of these denials. One-off denials—on any discourse—will remain plausible, and
so  given  that  plausible  deniability  suffices  for  the  avoidance  of  social  sanction,  Fricker's
reason will cease to exist on most occasions in which a speaker doesn't make denials too
often. But if we reject premise (2) of Peet's argument on the ground that plausible deniability
doesn't suffice to ensure that one is not to blame for a purported mismatch, then we can see
how a speaker will be incentivised to avoid making even a one-off (plausible) denial if she
cannot  ensure  that  she  won't  be  to  blame  for  the  mismatch  she  will  have  implied  has
happened. Whenever it  is easier for her to tailor her asserting behaviour to what she can
justify  than  it  is  for  her  to  be  epistemically  reckless  in  her  asserting  behaviour  while
remaining confident that she can exercise her capacity for plausible deniability in a way that
leaves her blameless for the purported mismatch, she'll be incentivised to keep her asserting
behaviour in epistemic check, for fear of social sanction. Thus we can see that Peet's argument
fails to show that Fricker's reasons vanish in contexts in which even a one-off plausible denial
is available.
8 Avoiding responsibility for mismatches
An improved version of Peet's argument would explicitly acknowledge the need to ensure
that  speakers  are  not  responsible  for  mismatches  in  order  for  speakers  to  be  able  to
confidently avoid social sanction for asserting something false, by exercising their capacity to
make plausible denials. Such an argument would look like this:
Improved Anti-TBV Argument
(1) If recovery of an asserted content requires extensive appeal to knowledge context
then the speaker will often have plausible deniability.
(2) If the speaker will often have plausible deniability and, if, often when she does so,
she won't make herself  blameworthy for mismatches then she will  often be able to
disclaim responsibility for the audience's belief.
(3)  Recovery  of  an  asserted  content  often  requires  extensive  appeal  to  knowledge
context.
(4)  Often,  when  a  speaker  has  plausible  deniability,  she  won't  make  herself
blameworthy for mismatches.
Therefore:
(5) The speaker is often able to disclaim responsibility for the audience's belief.
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The question now is, why should we accept premise (4)? I will not make an earnest attempt to
show that premise (4) is true or false. But I will explain why the various considerations which
Peet puts forward in favour of the ease with which a speaker can construct a story that would
allow her to make a plausible denial do not support premise (4).
Firstly, Peet argues that plausible deniability is common by providing support for the claims
that context-sensitivity is widespread and that context-sensitivity requires that audiences rely
upon knowledge context. However, the fact that the audience relies upon knowledge context
when recovering the speaker's intended content doesn't by itself tell us who is responsible for
false  representations  within  knowledge  context.  If  I  am  representing  you,  and  you  are
pretending to be a taxi driver, when in fact you have no such credentials, but I think you're a
taxi  driver,  then I  have a false representation of  you. But I  have that false representation
because of  your efforts  at  deceiving me,  and not because I  made a mistake in the way I
formed that representation of you. You are to blame for my false representation. Not me.
Secondly, when Peet (2015, p. 39) wants to stress just how easy it is to produce a story that
would  imply  that  one  didn't  intend  to  communicate  what  one's  audience  took  one  to
communicate, he alludes to the fact that what the speaker will have intended will depend
upon her  mental  states  and the  speaker  is  epistemically  privileged with respect  to  those
states,  as  compared  with  the  audience.  This  privilege  means  that  the  speaker  is  more
authoritative than the audience on factors that bear upon what the speaker intended. Thus,
commonly, the audience will not be able to effectively challenge the speaker's claims about
her own intentions. But again, none of this implies that it's easy for the speaker to show that
she  has  no blame for  any  (purported)  resulting mismatch.  It  doesn't  tell  us  whether  the
audience was unreasonable in her interpretation of the speaker or instead the speaker failed
to make the relevant state of her mind available to her audience.
Thirdly, as we have seen, Peet's illustrations of plausible denials are not illustrations of ways
in which the speaker can easily avoid blame for mismatch—in both examples, the speaker
takes a significant risk (in putting forward his denial) that he will be blamed for the implied
mismatch.
So, the considerations that support the contention that plausible deniability is easy to come by
do not provide support for premise (4) of the improved argument. It might be possible to find
a  way  to  defend  premise  (4).  The  trick  would  be  to  find  a  strategy  or  procedure  for
constructing stories that (confidently) leave the speaker blameless, but which don't simply
reject the speaker's competence at communicating what she intends—since such a rejection
(as we have seen) would be inconsistent with other premises of the argument and would lead
to a general scepticism about testimonial knowledge, rather than a problem specifically for
TBVs. But, as I said, I won't pursue such a strategy here.
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9 Studying linguistic context-sensitive communication
We have seen that influential voices in the philosophical study of context-sensitive linguistic
communication  have  a  tendency  to  think  of  speakers  as  speakers  only.  Such  a  tendency
automatically skews our sense of what speakers and their audiences achieve when context-
sensitive linguistic communication goes well. The speaker can modify her words but besides
that  she  can  do  very  little  to  make  plain  what  content  she  intends  to  communicate  by
producing  them:  one  is  left  imagining  someone  who  tries  to  carry  out  Wittgenstein's
experiment (say “it's cold here” and mean “it's hot here”) merely by playing with the stress
on the words “it's cold here.” The audience is then left with the hermeneutical challenge of
“inferring” what the speaker's hidden intention might be. Those who seek to describe and
explain  context-sensitive  linguistic  communication  are  then  supposed  to  describe  the
strategies available to the audience for surmounting this hermeneutical challenge.
But a speaker is not just a speaker. A speaker is a baker giving instructions in the kitchen, or
taking  orders  at  the  counter.  A speaker  is  not  reduced  in  her  efforts  at  publicizing  her
intentions merely to choosing between different words and the stress to place upon them. For
she  can  openly  embed  her  speech  within  broader  activities  that  she  dramatizes  for  her
audience in a broader context (one that includes conversational turns, social events, roles etc.).
These  will  place  instrumental  normative  constraints  on  the  contents  she  could rationally
intend by her words when she utters  them. The task of  the audience in context-sensitive
linguistic  communication  can  be  significantly  facilitated  if  the  speaker  dramatizes  those
actions of hers which bear upon the intentions she has for her words. Given this possibility,
one  wonders  why  philosophers  of  language  who  have  an  interest  in  context-sensitive
linguistic communication have generally ignored the research that has been done on these
contexts, and the actions done within them. Although informing one's accounts of context-
sensitive  linguistic  communication  with  psychological  research  is  considered  de  rigueur,
informing one's accounts with conversational analytic studies of conversational actions done
by talking, and with detailed ethnomethodological studies of the non-conversational actions
done  by  talking,  as  well  as  the  contexts  in  which  all  this  happens,  are  thought  to  be
permissibly substituted with J.L. Austin's or Charles Travis' imagined scenarios. But perhaps
this  is  a  mistake.  If  speakers  are  incentivized  not  to  exercise  their  capacity  to  produce
plausible denials by a filigree of obligations to publicize their intentions when speaking, then
it is a mistake to think that context-sensitive linguistic communication is achieved prior to or
independently of the doing of other things; and if it is, then we cannot study the one without
studying the other.
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